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A permanent zero interest rate would maximise GDP. 
Ralph S. Musgrave. 
 
Abstract. 
The arguments for government borrowing do not stand inspection, 
thus the effect of such borrowing is to artificially raise interest rates 
above their free market level. Since GDP is maximised where prices 
are at the free market level, absent good reasons for thinking 
otherwise, it follows that the GDP maximising rate of interest is zero, 
in the sense that no interest should be offered to those holding base 
money.  
It is just possible that there are arguments for a limited amount of 
borrowing to fund public investments like infrastructure, though 
conventional thinking on that point is chaotic at the moment. But 
even if that infrastructure idea is accepted, it does not change the 
above “permanent zero interest rate” conclusion. 
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1. Introduction. 
The idea that government should not borrow, i.e. the idea that a 
permanent zero interest rate is best, is not new: Friedman (1948, 
Section II), Mosler (2010, 2
nd
 last paragraph) and Forstater and 
Mosler (2005) advocated it. The purpose of this paper is to set out 
much more detailed reasons for a “no borrowing / zero interest rate” 
regime than given by the first two of the later three works, and 
simpler and clearer reasons than given by the third.  
To make the “no government borrowing” argument, it is clearly 
necessary to show that the arguments for government borrowing are 
without merit, and much of the discussion below is concerned with 
that point. Nine arguments for government borrowing are examined 
below and shown to be badly flawed (sections 2-10), though it is 
conceded that if the advocates of government borrowing to fund 
infrastructure and similar public investments get their act together, 
they could possibly make a case for such borrowing. 
The discussion assumes that government is “monetarily sovereign”, 
that is, government together with its central bank issues its own 
money: that applies to countries like the US or UK which have their 
own form of money (the US dollar and the Pound). Although the 
same arguments apply to common currency areas like the Eurozone, 
care needs to be taken in applying the arguments to individual 
Eurozone countries, i.e. countries which do not issue their own 
currencies. The exact way in which these arguments do apply to 
individual Eurozone countries is not considered below. 
The word “state” refers here to government and central bank 
combined, while the word “government” refers to government alone 
and “central bank” to central bank alone. The word “infrastructure” 
will not be used henceforth: the phrase “public investment” will be 
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used instead since there are forms of public investment other than 
infrastructure which could be funded via government borrowing. 
 
2. Government bonds provide a means of saving? 
One argument for government borrowing is that relevant bonds 
provide savers with a means of saving. 
However, without government bonds, savers are free to stock up on 
as much base money as they like. That is, under the regime 
advocated here, where the state creates enough base money to keep 
the economy at capacity, but offers no interest on that money, any 
increased desire by the private sector to save or hoard base money is 
easily accommodated by the state issuing more of the stuff. As to 
whether savers have any sort of moral right to interest on their 
savings, it is hard to see why, particularly given that it is taxpayers 
who fund that interest. It is not clear why money should be 
confiscated from one set of people (taxpayers) simply because 
another set want more interest on their savings than is available 
from private sector investments. 
Moreover, it might seem that interest should be offered on base 
money so as to encourage saving. Unfortunately while the artificially 
high rate of interest brought about that policy would certainly 
encourage savers to hold a larger stock of interest yielding base 
money than they otherwise would, it would result in a smaller stock 
of real savings: real in the sense of physical assets, investments in  
education and so on. In short, the population would have a larger 
stock of an entirely artificial or fictitious asset (i.e. base money, any 
amount of which can be created at the press of a computer keyboard 
button), and a smaller stock of what really matters, that is, real 
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assets. In particular, mortgagors have to pay more interest where the 
above “encourage saving” policy is adopted, and thus live in smaller 
houses. That all makes a nonsense of the “encourages saving” idea. 
 
3. Smoothing out receipts from tax. 
Another argument for government borrowing is that it can allegedly 
smooth out irregularities in government income derived from tax: 
more money arrives in government coffers from tax in some months 
than others. 
The latter idea is in fact a classic example of one of the most 
common mistakes in economics, namely extrapolating from the 
microeconomic to the macroeconomic. That is, if a microeconomic 
entity like a household or firm is short of cash for a few months, it 
has to do something about it: e.g. ask the bank for a temporary loan. 
In contrast, no such problems face a state: for the months when 
receipts from tax are less than usual, states can simply print money, 
and do some “unprinting” during months when receipts from tax are 
higher than normal. Of course that arrangement involves 
government borrowing in that government borrows from the central 
bank, but there is no borrowing involved in the sense of the state 
borrowing from the private sector. 
As for the idea that during the months when receipts are lower than 
normal (i.e. when the private sector has more than a normal amount 
of cash) the private sector will go on a spending spree with that cash, 
that is unlikely: to illustrate, if a private sector entity knows it will 
have to pay $Y in tax a few months’ time, and has about $Y more 
than it really needs in the bank, it is unlikely to go on a spending 
spree with that cash. 
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4. Funding public investments. 
Another popular argument for government borrowing is that it can 
fund public investments. Indeed, so popular is that idea that it has its 
very own name: the “golden rule”. Or to be more exact, the golden 
rule is the idea that government should borrow only to invest, not to 
fund current spending. 
One important anomaly in the golden rule is that education is one 
huge investment, but it is never suggested that borrowing should 
fund all education. It is widely accepted that “investment” means 
expenditure which yields benefits over several years or decades and 
education certainly has that characteristic. In short, advocates of the 
golden rule seem to think it applies to physical investments, but not 
necessarily to intellectual investments. 
Of course the types of education that are funded via borrowing 
(including borrowing by those receiving the education) rather than 
tax varies from country to country. But certainly the first ten years or 
so of education in most countries (kid’s education) is normally 
funded via tax, for those who choose state education rather than 
private education for their kids. 
 
4.1 Investment justifies borrowing? 
Another factor which makes the golden rule appealing is that 
borrowing often funds investments in the private sector, from which 
it seems to be deduced that investment automatically justifies 
borrowing. Unfortunately that argument is flawed. 
Few entities (households, corporations, etc) borrow to make 
investments if they have enough spare cash to fund the investment. 
There is clearly no point in paying interest to anyone when you do 
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not need to. And governments have a near inexhaustible source of 
cash, namely the taxpayer. In addition, the state can print a limited 
amount of money in most years. 
Moreover, it is not even true that it is just investments that justify 
borrowing: it can perfectly well make sense to fund consumption / 
current spending via borrowing. For example  if a credit-worthy 
individual wants to spend a significant sum on a consumption item 
(e.g. a wedding and honeymoon) and repay the  money over a few 
years, there would no good reason for a bank to turn down that loan 
application. 
To summarize, the justification for borrowing is not the fact of 
making an investment: it is the fact of being short of cash. 
And finally, for some more arguments against the golden rule, see 
Kellerman (2006). 
 
4.2 Spreading costs over generations. 
Another popular argument for funding public investment via 
borrowing is that such borrowing spreads the cost of the investment 
over the generations that benefit from the investment: i.e. future 
generations allegedly pay part of the cost in that they have to pay 
interest on the loans and repay the principal. 
However, that argument is flawed: it assumes time travel is possible! 
That is, the real resources required to build a bridge in 2018 (steel, 
concrete, person-hours, etc) cannot possibly be supplied by people 
living in 2030: the laws of physics (never mind the laws of economics) 
dictate that they must be supplied by those living in 2018 or earlier. 
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As for the idea that future generations must repay the debt incurred 
to create public investments, future generations do not just inherit 
that liability: they also inherit an asset, namely the bonds that fund 
public investments. The latter liabilities and assets cancel each other 
out. 
The only exception to the latter “zero inheritance” point arises 
where one country borrows from another so as to fund investments, 
as explained by Musgrave (1939). That is, it is clearly physically 
possible for country A to supply the physical goods and/or labour 
needed to create an investment in country B in any given year, with 
physical goods etc flowing the other way in subsequent years so as 
to repay the debt. (Incidentally Musgrave did not actually advocate 
the latter cross border method of funding public investments: he 
simply pointed to the fact that cross border arrangements could in 
theory be used to spread costs across generations.) 
But any country trying to exploit the latter “Musgrave” phenomenon 
with a view to spreading costs across generations faces an obvious 
problem:  if country A tries to induce country B to fund its public 
investments, there is nothing to stop country B doing the reverse, 
that is trying to get country A to fund country B’s public investments! 
Indeed most countries in the world have significant holdings of the 
debt of other countries’ debt, which reduces the entire “get future 
generations to pay” idea to a bit of a nonsense. 
 
4.3 Is time travel is possible? 
In contrast to the above claim that time travel is not possible, Rowe 
(2012) claimed time travel is in a sense possible. Rowe’s argument 
was as follows. 
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Say a government funds investment in a particular decade via 
borrowing.  The relevant bonds will be bought by people of working 
age saving for retirement.  Then, during their retirement, they will 
sell those bonds, or at least some of them to the next generation, 
which itself is also saving for retirement. 
That process can clearly continue for several generations, until the 
final generation. Instead of benefitting from the bonds during that 
generation’s retirement years, the money it saves is simply used to 
write off relevant government debt, and that is clearly an imposition 
on, or a cost born by the last generation.  
Of course the cost of relevant investments does not have to be 
loaded entirely onto the last generation: it can be spread across each 
generation between the initial investment and the disappearance of 
the last bonds. But it is still an idea on a hiding to nothing because 
governments make roughly the same amount of public investment 
every year, thus the whole attempt to “spread the cost across 
several generations” is a bureaucratic waste of time. 
Moreover those of working age already engage in a fair amount of 
“bond purchasing from oldies” in that that is how many pension 
schemes work. That is, a funded pension scheme works by having 
those of working age purchase assets, including bonds, which in their 
retirement are then sold (so as to fund relevant retirement years), 
and some of those assets will be sold to people of working age at 
that time.  So the fact that “purchasing bonds from oldies” takes 
place anyway is a second reason for thinking that any attempt to 
accurately apportion the cost of public sector investment over 
several generations is a waste of time. 
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4.4 Borrowing for public investments smooths out taxation? 
The final argument for having borrowing fund public investments 
considered here is the idea that borrowing can smooth out tax 
payments: public investments sometimes involve very large sums 
which are spent in a relatively short period of time, and that 
spending would arguably lead to large rises and falls in tax if those 
investments were funded via tax.  
The flaw in that argument is that for any large or medium size 
country, the total amount spent on public investments does not vary 
much from year to year, thus there is little smoothing to be done. 
Moreover, it is not even desirable to have such spending vary much 
from year to year. Reason is that big gyrations in the amount spent 
on for example road construction lead to increase costs: in years 
when there is little of that sort of spending, those with skills in road 
construction migrate to other industries, thus they are hard to find 
come the next boom in road construction. Plus relevant capital 
equipment tends to be left lying idle during years when there is little 
of that sort of spending. 
 
4.5 Borrow more when interest rates rise? 
Another anomaly in the idea that borrowing should fund public 
investment is this. When the advocates of the latter idea have got 
their act together and proved that some percentage of public 
investment should be funded via borrowing, presumably that 
percentage will vary inversely with interest rate changes. That is, 
normal procedure adopted by households and businesses is to 
borrow less when interest rates rise. But under current 
arrangements, the reverse obtains with state borrowing! 
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For example when an interest rate rise is deemed appropriate, 
central banks bring about that rise by selling government debt: i.e. 
the state as a whole borrows more!  
 
4.6 Public investment summarized.  
To summarize so far, at least four weaknesses in the idea that 
borrowing should fund public investments have been set out: 1, the 
education anomaly in the golden rule, 2, the idea that investment 
justifies borrowing was shown to be invalid, 3, the future generations 
idea was shown to be invalid, and 4, the tax smoothing idea was 
shown to be invalid. Thus the idea that government borrowing is 
justified if it funds public investments is clearly very questionable. 
If that is the case, then it is beginning to look like government should 
borrow nothing, as suggested by Friedman, Forstater and Mosler. 
And that in turn equals a permanent zero interest rate policy. 
However, let’s be generous towards advocates of government 
borrowing, and concede that some borrowing to fund public 
investments is justified, for some reason or other. If that is the case, 
certainly the advocates of public investment borrowing need to 
explain exactly why such borrowing is justified and what the 
optimum amount of such borrowing is.  
But let’s assume advocates of public investment borrowing sort all 
that out and prove that some particular amount of borrowing to 
fund public investment, perhaps as a percentage of GDP, is justified 
each year. Central banks cannot then use relevant bonds to adjust 
interest rates because that involves departing from the latter 
percentage, and funding public investments via tax or base money 
creation which is the method advocated in this paper and by Milton 
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Friedman and others! That is, if government borrows money to fund 
investments, but the central bank, which is essentially part of the 
state apparatus, then creates new money and buys back some of the 
relevant bonds, then in effect it is freshly created money that has 
funded relevant investments. That is a self-contradiction. 
Incidentally, a similar point applies to having the central bank create 
money and buy private sector bonds, a device actually used to a 
limited extent as part of QE and which could be used to adjust 
interest rates. That is, if it is decided that a particular industry is best 
left in private sector hands, but bonds issued by that industry are 
then bought by the central bank, that amounts to a self-
contradiction: it rather contradicts the latter point that various 
industries are best left in private hands. 
 
5. Borrowing with a view to stimulus. 
Another argument for government borrowing is the fact that having 
government borrow money and spend it, and/or cut taxes is 
stimulatory.  While “borrow and spend” is doubtless stimulatory, it is 
not obvious what the merits of the “borrow” part of that process are: 
the fact of borrowing in isolation is clearly deflationary or “anti-
stimulatory”. That is, the simple fact of borrowing money and then 
doing nothing with the money concerned is deflationary. 
The alternative is to have the state simply print base money and 
spend it. “Print and spend” does not have any “anti-stimulatory” 
element.  
A possible argument for “borrow and spend” is that it is easier to 
reverse than “print and spend”: it is easy for the central bank to sell 
some of the bonds in its possession so as to raise interest rates.  
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However that argument is debatable and for the following two 
reasons. 
i) The fact of having implemented some “print and spend” does not 
stop central banks raising interest rates: that is, absent government 
bonds, there is nothing in principle to stop a central bank offering to 
borrow at above the going rate with a view to raising interest rates. 
Where the latter strategy is not allowed under existing legislation, 
there is no good reason for not changing that legislation. 
ii) The latter novel way of raising interest rates might seem to clash 
with one of the basic claims of this paper, namely that interest rate 
adjustments should be abolished or at least should be used more 
sparingly. In fact the latter “borrowing by the central bank” method 
of raising interest rates is simply a concession to political realities: i.e. 
it is not a good technical argument or a good argument so far as 
economic theory goes. 
To expand on that, there are no strictly technical or economic 
arguments against reversing a bout of “print and spend” with tax 
increases or public spending cuts (the choice between which would 
depend on the ideological preference of the party in power). 
However, the unfortunate reality is that there can be POLITICAL 
problems stemming from tax increases or public spending cuts. Thus 
(to repeat), the above mentioned apparent clash is not a clash so far 
as strictly technical or economic matters go: it is simply a concession 
that might need to be made to political realities. That is, the latter 
concession does not weaken the basic argument put in this paper, 
namely that ideally and in order to maximise GDP, there should be 
no government (or central bank) borrowing, except perhaps for 
public investment purposes. 
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In particular, the above mentioned tax increases or public spending 
cuts, if implemented properly, would not need to have any effect on 
real living standards or on numbers employed or on the amount of 
public spending in real terms. To illustrate, if was thought that 
aggregate demand was excessive and needed to be cut by X%, and 
private and public spending were cut by that amount, the sole effect 
would be to be keep inflation under control rather than cut real 
private and public spending. 
  
6. Irresponsible borrowing by politicians. 
A further argument for government borrowing is that politicians 
should have the right to borrow if they see fit. In fact politicians are 
sometimes grossly irresponsible in that connection. Indeed, one of 
the worst cases of that irresponsibility is taking place at the time of 
writing in the US. 
That is, over the last few years Republicans have complained 
incessantly about the alleged excessive deficit and debt. But those 
complaints were largely or wholly unjustified given that a larger than 
normal deficit was needed to escape the recession. As for the motive 
for those complaints, the motive was simply to cast doubt on the 
economic competence of Democrats.  
Worse still, now that Republicans are in power and given that the 
recession is, at the time of writing, all but over, there is clearly no 
need for a large deficit, or even a need for any deficit at all. But 
Republicans have let the deficit go through the roof! 
Moreover, this is not the first time Republicans have complained 
about the deficit when not in power, only to implement record size 
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deficits as soon as they get into power. It is difficult to imagine how 
Republicans could be more irresponsible and dishonest if they tried. 
The conclusion is that giving politicians the power to borrow is 
equivalent to putting a fox in charge of a hen house. As Hume (1742) 
put it, the freedom to borrow, if granted to politicians   “….will 
almost infallibly be abused”. 
In fact, given the lack of any good arguments for government 
borrowing, it is legitimate to ask exactly why such borrowing takes 
place, and Hume arguably got the answer right there as well. As he 
said in the sentence before the latter quote, “It is very tempting to a 
minister to employ such an expedient, as enables him to make a 
great figure during his administration, without overburdening the 
people with taxes, or exciting any immediate clamours against 
himself.” 
  
7. Why boost just borrowing in a recession? 
Another argument for  government debt and the interest rate 
adjustments that debt facilitates is that come a recession, it is 
desirable to increase lending and borrowing rather than increase one 
of the other elements of aggregate demand, like consumer spending 
or exports. In fact there is no obviously good reason for that.  
Certainly when central banks cut interest rates, they do not do so on 
the basis of detailed research showing the decline in demand is due 
to an entirely irrational fall in demand for loans, rather than a fall in 
say consumer spending. (Note that if a fall in demand is attributable 
to rational rather than irrational reasons for less lending, then there 
is no reason to boost lending via interest rate cuts rather than boost 
consumer spending and/or public spending.) 
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Moreover the basic purpose of the economy is to produce what the 
consumer wants (both the items the consumer chooses to buy out of 
disposable income and the items which consumers vote at election 
time to have supplied to them via public spending). Thus given a fall 
in demand, the obvious and simplest solution is to boost consumer 
and public spending.  
As to investment, firms supplying “disposable income” items and 
public sector entities supplying “voted for” items are well able to 
decide for themselves whether the extra demand warrants extra 
investment. 
 
8. Interest rate adjustments work quickly? 
A possible argument for government debt is that interest rate 
adjustments work more quickly and/or predictably than fiscal 
adjustments.  
Clearly interest rates can be adjusted by central banks at the flick of a 
switch. But whether those adjustments actually result in mortgage 
rates and other rates out in the real world changing all that quickly is 
debatable. Even when mortgage rates do change, there is a further 
substantial delay before extra construction jobs appear. Dyson (2010 
et al: 10) cites evidence as to the ineffectiveness of interest rate 
adjustments. 
Although in some countries the pace at which fiscal adjustments take 
place is slow, for example in the US, in the UK the finance minister 
has the power the change some taxes instantaneously. A central 
bank could also have the right to implement such adjustments itself 
(e.g. an increase or cut in payroll taxes), given too much delay by 
politicians, although in a democracy, politicians should obviously 
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have the right at a later date to cancel those central bank 
implemented fiscal adjustments and replace them with different 
ones. 
 
9. Government borrowing helps the rich lend to the poor? 
Given that the more a government borrows, the less the tax that 
taxpayers need pay, and given that everyone, including the poor are 
taxpayers, it follows that in effect, government borrowing helps the 
rich lend to the poor. And that might seem to be an argument for 
government borrowing. 
The problem there is that government, as an intermediary between 
rich and poor, is a subsidised intermediary:  governments have 
powers not possessed by normal commercial banks, or other 
intermediaries. Governments can imprison taxpayer and borrowers 
who do not pay their dues. Commercial banks cannot. 
The normal view in economics is that subsidies do not make sense 
unless there is a good social case for them. 
  
10. Market forces have a strong influence on interest rates. 
One good reason for state intervention in the market is to put right 
defects in the market. So if it can be shown that interest rates do not 
fall as far or fast in a recession as they would in a perfectly 
functioning free market, that would be a reason for artificially 
boosting that interest rate fall, come a recession. 
Unfortunately it is not obvious what is to stop market forces working 
in that connection: there are millions of borrowers and lenders, and 
hundreds of banks and similar intermediating between borrowers 
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and lenders. That is the sort of scenario where market forces 
normally work reasonably well. It is not clear why it is necessary to 
artificially boost those market force induced interest rate 
adjustments. Indeed, there has quite clearly been a dramatic fall in 
interest rates world-wide over the last twenty five years or so 
brought about by market forces. 
 
10.1 The Pigou effect. 
As regards the latter suggestion that there is little to stop interest 
rates changing in sympathy with market forces, and hence that 
interest rate changes by central banks are entirely artificial changes, 
it might seem that much the same applies to fiscal stimulus.  
In fact there is a big obstruction in the way of fiscal stimulus (or at 
least what is classified as fiscal stimulus here, namely “print and 
spend”).  
In a perfectly functioning free market, wages and prices would fall in 
a recession, which would increase the real value of money (and 
incidentally the real value of government debt). As Arthur Pigou 
explained, that increase in the real value of the private sector’s stock 
of liquid assets would induce the private sector to spend more. 
Unfortunately there is an obstruction in the way, namely Keynes’s 
“wages are sticky downwards” phenomenon.  
The latter problem can of course be solved by forcing pay cuts on 
employees, but that just leads to strikes and civil unrest. Alternative 
is to increase the real value of the private sector’s stock of base 
money via “print and spend”. 
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Incidentally, having said that falling wages and prices increases the 
real value of money, there are few points here that can be a source 
of confusion, and as follows. 
The important point as far as inducing the non-bank private sector to 
spend more goes, is the real value of the private sector’s stock of 
“net liquid assets”, for want of a better phrase. (It is the non-bank 
private sector which will (or won’t) increase spending when its stock 
of liquid assets rises). For example, while base money is a net asset 
as viewed by the private sector, every dollar issued by commercial 
banks is offset by a dollar of debt owed by the non-bank private 
sector. (Incidentally the latter “important point” explains why 
advocates of Modern Monetary Theory thought up the concept 
“Private Sector Net Financial Assets” – sometimes shortened to 
PSNFA.) 
Also, there is very little difference between base money and 
government debt, as explained by Wolf (2014). After a fall in wages 
and prices, the rise in the real value of government debt probably 
also induces the non-bank private sector to spend more.  
To summarise, while there is little to prevent interest rates changing 
in sympathy with market forces, there is a major obstruction in the 
way of another of the free market’s cures for a recession, that cure 
being to increase the real value of the private sector’s stock of 
money. And if that conclusion is correct, it follows that there is 
correspondingly little reason to use artificial interest rate 
adjustments to influence demand and a correspondingly good reason 
to have the state create and spend new money come a recession, 
and/or cut taxes. 
 
19 
 
 
11. Adjusting demand. 
Having hopefully shown that the arguments for government 
borrowing have few merits, it might seem that a problem then 
arises, namely how to adjust demand, given that currently demand is 
adjusted to a significant extent by adjusting interest rates, which 
itself requires or is much assisted by the existence of government 
bonds. 
Moreover fiscal stimulus, at least in the form of government 
borrowing, spending and issuing bonds is also impossible. Thus the 
only remaining alternative way of imparting stimulus (as already 
intimated) is for the central bank to create new base money, with 
government spending that money (and/or cutting taxes). 
Also, while it might seem the latter “print and spend” policy is new, it 
is actually nothing of the sort: several countries have engaged in 
“print and spend” in recent years. 
That is, governments have borrowed heavily, spent the relevant 
money and given bonds to lenders, while at the same time QE has 
been implemented, which consists of the central bank creating new 
money and buying back those bonds. That all nets out to the state 
creating money and spending it and/or cutting taxes. 
And going back even further in history, Keynes (1933, 5
th
 paragraph) 
advocated “print and spend”. 
 
12. Politicians’ and central banks’ responsibilities.  
Another apparent problem thrown up by a zero borrowing regime 
and the “print and spend” method of imparting stimulus that follows 
in its train is that the division of responsibilities as between central 
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bank and government would need re-thinking. In particular: who 
exactly decides how much to print and spend in any given year, and 
who decides what to spend the money on? 
Clearly it is unacceptable for the central bank to decide how much to 
spend on education, defence, social security and so on: those are 
political decisions. 
In fact the solution to the latter problem was devised a few years ago 
by Dyson and Jackson (2012: Chapter 7) and Dyson et al (2010: 10-
12). As the latter work put it, “We recommend that an independent 
body, the Money Creation Committee should take decisions over 
how much money should be created, while the elected government 
of the day should make the decision over how that money will be 
spent.” 
As Dyson explains in both of the latter works, it does not really 
matter where the latter body is based: it could be based at the 
central bank. The important point is that it is as free of political 
influence as possible. Indeed, in the case of the UK, the above 
“independent body” could perfectly well be the existing Bank of 
England Monetary Policy Committee. 
The latter “Dyson” solution got support of a sort from Bernanke 
(2016). See Bernanke’s paragraph starting “A possible 
arrangement…”.  
 
13. Central bank independence. 
Having said it is desirable to keep politicians away from the latter 
sort of committee, that point is actually debatable. The Bank of 
England was not granted independence till 1997: that is, it was at 
least nominally under the control of a politician, the UK finance 
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minister. But inflation was not a huge problem for most of the time 
between the end of WWII and 1997. There was of course the 1970s 
inflationary episode, but that is not generally attributed in the UK to 
the Bank of England’s lack of independence.  Also Jácome and 
Vázquez (2005) found little relationship between central bank 
independence and inflation in South America and the Carribean. 
However, the consensus seems to be that it is best for central banks 
to be independent, and on that assumption, Dyson’s proposed split 
split of responsibilities is a neat way of implementing “print and 
spend”. 
The main purpose of those Dyson works is to advocate full reserve 
banking or “100% reserves” as Milton Friedman and others call it. As 
we do not have full reserve banking in place, references to Dyson 
might seem less relevant. In fact his split of responsibilities would 
work under the existing bank system just as well as under full 
reserve. 
 
14. Conclusion. 
Hopefully the basic argument put in this paper has been successfully 
made, that argument being as follows. 
1. The arguments for government borrowing are badly flawed, thus 
ideally there should be no government borrowing. That in turn 
means that the existence of government borrowing artificially raises 
interest rates to above their free market level, which reduces GDP. 
Thus the GDP maximising rate of interest is zero, in the sense that 
ideally the state should issue enough base money to keep the 
economy working at capacity, but should not offer interest to 
holders of that money. 
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2. Feeble as the arguments for borrowing to fund public investments 
are, it is just possible that at some time in the future, advocates of 
that borrowing get their house in order and manage to demonstrate 
the optimum amount of such borrowing, perhaps expressed as a 
percentage of GDP. But having done that, central banks cannot then 
create fresh base money and buy up those bonds with a view to 
influencing interest rates because that involves in effect funding 
public investments with freshly created money, which is exactly the 
form of funding advocated in this paper! 
3. An absence of government borrowing rules out fiscal stimulus in 
the form of extra public spending or tax cuts funded by government 
borrowing. It also rules out, or at least makes interest rate 
adjustments more difficult. 
4. However, disposing or largely disposing of the latter two forms of 
stimulus is not a problem, since stimulus can be imparted by having 
the state create and spend more base money, and/or cut taxes. 
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